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THE CIVIL CONFINEMENT OF SEXUAL
PREDATORS: A DELICATE BALANCE
EDWARD P. RA*
INTRODUCTION
In May of 1989, a seven-year-old boy was attacked while riding
his bicycle near his home in Tacoma, Washington.1 The boy was
dragged into the woods where he was raped, choked and sexually
mutilated.2 The attacker then cut off the boy's penis leaving him
in the dirt in a semiconscious state.3 The boy's attacker, Earl
Shriner, was mentally retarded and had a twenty-four year
record of attacks on young people.4 Two years earlier, Shriner
had been released from prison after serving a ten year sentence
for the kidnapping and assault of two teenage girls. 5 Prior to his
release, corrections officials sought to have him committed to a
J.D. Candidate 2007, St. John's University School of Law; B.A. Computer Science,
Loyola College in Maryland, May 2004.
1 See Raquel Blacher, Comment, Historical Perspective of the "Sex Psychopath"
Statute: From the Revolutionary Era to the Present Federal Crime Bill, 46 MERCER L. REV.
889, 908 (1995) (describing one of a trilogy of violent sexual crimes in Washington state
and public reaction); see also Barry Siegel, Locking Up 'Sexual Predators,- A Public Outcry
in Washington State Targeted Repeat Violent Sex Criminals. A New Preventative Law
Would Keep Them in Jail Indefinitely, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1990, at Al (discussing the
public's denouncement of violent sex crimes).
2 See Blacher, supra note 1, at 908 (describing that Shriner took a seven year old boy
into the woods, raped him and strangled him); see also Siegel, supra note 1, at Al (stating
that a "7-year-old boy riding his bike near his Tacoma home was dragged into the nearby
woods, raped, choked nearly to death and sexually mutilated").
3 See Blacher, supra note 1, at 908 (describing that Earl K. Shriner cut off his victim's
penis); see also Siegel, supra note 1, at Al (stating that "[b]efore leaving him semi-
conscious in the dirt, Earl K. Shriner cut off the boy's penis").
4 See Blacher, supra note 1, at 908-09 (describing that "Shriner had a history of
violent crimes" and previously spent time in a mental institution); see also Siegel, supra
note 1, at Al (stating that "Shriner had a 24-year record of assaults on young people" and
was diagnosed "at the age of 3 as being mentally retarded").
5 See Blacher, supra note 1, at 909 (describing that Shriner "kidnapped and assaulted
two teenage girls"); see also Siegel, supra note 1, at Al (stating that upon Shriner's
release from prison in his "mid-20s, he'd kidnapped and assaulted two teen-age girls").
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state hospital rather than release such a dangerous individual. 6
Although a psychiatric evaluation concluded that Shriner had
unusual sadistic sexual fantasies and a desire to carry them
through, doctors ruled he did not meet the legal criteria for
confinement because he was neither mentally ill nor acting in a
violently dangerous manner. 7 Since the state could not commit
people unless they suffered from a recognized mental disorder
rendering them immediately and substantially dangerous,
Shriner was released. 8 Just two years after this failed attempt to
confine him, Shriner committed the heinous crime described
above.
This incident sparked outrage in the State of Washington and
provided the impetus for the Washington State Community
Protection Act of 1990,9 the first of the modern sexually violent
predator acts.lO Unfortunately, similar incidents have occurred
all around the United States. In response, outraged communities
have pushed for tougher laws against sex offenders, including sex
offender civil commitment acts. Being the first of its kind, the
Washington Act became a model for other sexually violent
predator (SVP) statutes around the country." In Kansas v.
6 See Blacher, supra note 1, at 909 (stating that "[s]tate correction officials attempted
to commit Shriner for treatment under Washington's Involuntary Treatment Act"); see
also Siegel, supra note 1, at Al (describing that officials "tried to get him committed
involuntarily to Western State Hospital").
7 See Blacher, supra note 1, at 909 (stating that "Shriner... could not be committed
under the involuntary commitment act because he failed to meet the two criteria
necessary: Shriner was not mentally ill and he had not performed any overt act during
confinement ... demonstrating dangerousness to himself or others"); see also Siegel,
supra note 1, at Al (describing that "doctors ruled he didn't meet the legal criteria,
because he wasn't mentally ill or, just then, acting in a violently dangerous manner").
8 See Blacher, supra note 1, at 909 (stating that the "Tacoma paper printed editorials
responding to Shriner's criminal history and the system's inadequacy to civilly commit
Shriner for indefinite period of time"); see also Siegel, supra note 1, at Al (describing the
public outrage that resulted from releasing Shriner).
9 WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.09.010 - 71.09.902 (West 2006).
10 See W. Lawrence Fitch, Sexual Offender Commitment in the United States:
Legislative and Policy Concerns, 989 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 489, 491 (2003) (stating that
Washington's law was first of the new breed of sexual offender commitment laws); see also
Law EnforcementlDSHS Notification, http://www.doc.wa.gov/CPUllawenfjindex.htm (last
visited Nov. 5, 2006) (stating that "the primary function of the program is to provide law
enforcement with timely and accurate information on registerable sex/kidnapping
offenders who release from Department of Corrections institutions (prisons) to the
community").
11 See Fitch, supra note 10, at 491 (stating that at least fourteen jurisdictions pattern
their laws on the law in Washington State); see also Eric S. Janus & Wayne A. Logan,
Substantive Due Process and the Involuntary Confinement of Sexually Violent Predators,
35 CONN. L. REV. 319, 321 (2003) (noting that "states have confined over 2400 SVPs
during the past several years").
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Hendricks,12 the central Supreme Court case examining the
Constitutionality of SVP statutes, the Court upheld a Kansas
statute modeled after the Washington Act. This paper seeks to
examine sexually violent predator statutes from their very
foundations working to their implementation and ultimate
effectiveness. Part II looks at the problem of sexual predators
and the solutions that have been implemented throughout the
country in order to address this problem. Additionally, it gives a
fundamental understanding of how civil confinement statutes
work. Part III examines several keystone issues including where
states draw the power to pass such statutes and the
constitutional issues they raise. Part IV looks at the Supreme
Court's decisions relating to civil confinement which have given
the states solid ground on which to continue the practice of civilly
confining sexual predators. Finally, Part V addresses four
features of SVP statutes which this author feels are essential for
allowing a state to adequately protect society while, at the same
time, giving consideration to the rights of the confined individual.
I. SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS
A. The Root of the Problem
In recent years, the problem of sex offender recidivism has
gained greater national attention in part because of incidents
like the one described above. The problem is made particularly
complex in that studies have failed to show sex offenders as any
more likely to be repeat offenders than are other criminals.13 In a
study conducted by the United States Bureau of Justice,
researchers tracked released offenders for a three year period
following their release from prison. 14 Of the 9,691 sex offenders
12 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
13 See Steven I. Friedland, On Treatment, Punishment, and the Civil Commitment of
Sex Offenders, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 73, 83 (1989) (stating the difficulty in determining
recidivism rates for sex offenders); see also Candace J. Samolinski, When Predators Walk;
After Horrible Cases of Sexual Abuse, the Florida Legislature Considers Placing Released
Convicts in Mental Institutions, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 1, 1998, at 1 (discussing that "[a]mong
career criminals, police and mental health experts agreed they may be the most
calculating and hardest to control").
14 See Jennifer B. Siverts, Note and Comment, Punishing Thoughts Too Close to
Reality: A New Solution to Protect Children From Pedophiles, 27 T. JEFFERSON L. REV.
393, 397 (2005) (stating that "[olne of the most comprehensive and detailed studies on sex
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released in the fifteen states studied, 517 of them (5.3%) were
rearrested for a new sex crime within three years.15 However, a
study conducted by the Washington State Institute for Public
Policy,16 found much more significant recidivism rates although
in a much smaller sample size. 17 The study tracked sixty-one sex
offenders released in Washington State during follow-up periods
of various lengths.18 During this time more than half of the group
was rearrested19 and twenty-eight percent were rearrested for a
new sex crime.2 0
Additional consideration should also be given to the difficulty
in truly measuring sex offender recidivism. Since sex crimes are
notoriously underreported 2' it becomes more difficult to measure
whether offenders are truly first time offenders and whether
those who have been released are committing new crimes.
Regardless of the true level of recidivism amongst sexual
offenders' recidivism rates was conducted by the Department of Justice"); see also Patrick
A. Langan, Erica L. Schmitt & Matthew R. Durose, Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released
from Prison in 1994, 1 (U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs 2003, NCJ
198281), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govIbjs/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf (stating that this
study tracked 9,691 male sex offenders in fifteen states for three full years following their
release from prison in 1994 and was released by the Justice Department in 2003).
15 See Langan, supra note 14, at 21 (stating that new sex crimes were forcible rapes
and sexual assaults and almost 40% of these new sex crimes were committed within the
first year of release); see also Siverts, supra note 14, at 398 (stating that "[tihe study
followed approximately ten thousand convicted sex offenders released from prison in 1994
and measured their rate of re-arrest, reconviction, and re-imprisonment during the three
year period following release.").
16 See Donna Schram & Cheryl Darling Milloy, Sexually Violent Predators and Civil
Commitment (Washington State Institute for Public Policy ed., 1998) (conducting a study
during the first six years after the passage of the Washington Sexually Violent Predator
statute, ranging from June 1990 through June 1996).
17 See id. (tracking the recidivism of 61 offenders in the State of Washington who
were recommended for civil confinement but for whom petitions were never filed because
the prosecutor determined that one or more of the requirements for civil confinement
could not be met).
18 See id. at 9 (stating that following-up periods ranged from 5 to 70 months with a
mean length of 46.1 months).
19 See id. (showing that 36 out of 61 were rearrested for some offense during the
follow-up period).
20 See id. (stating that the vast majority (76%) of these new sex crimes were contact
crimes including rape and assault, while most other offenses could be considered to be
crimes which lead to child molestation).
21 See R. Karl Hanson & Monique T. Bussiere, Predicting Relapse: A Meta-Analysis of
Sexual Offender Recidivism Studies, 66 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 348, 357
(1998) (stating that many offenses go undetected and thus rates may be underestimated);
see also Sherry F. Colb, Assuming Facts Not In Evidence: A Response to Russell M.
Coombs, Reforming New Jersey Evidence Law on Fresh Complaint of Rape, 25 RUTGERS L.
J. 745, 753 (1994) (noting "[t]he Rape in America report disclosed that only 16% of sexual
assault victims ever report the assault to the police ... [t]he Senate Judiciary Committee
found an even lower reporting rate of 7%, compared with a reporting rate of 53% for
robberies.").
[Vol. 22:1
CIVIL CONFINEMENT OF SEXUAL PREDA TORS
predators, this remains a serious problem given the serious long
term effects on their victims. 22
B. Solutions Utilized
The number of new approaches being utilized to address the
problem of sex offender recidivism is not surprising given the
strong feelings stories like that of Earl Shriner are sure to
inspire. 23 The proper way to address the problem of sexual
predators is nonetheless a difficult legal issue. 24 This issue
involves the delicate balance of two competing goals: reducing
predation on the one hand, and treating predators fairly on the
other. 25 This issue is made more complicated in that it may be
very difficult to achieve one of these goals without compromising
the other. 26 As a result, the Supreme Court has imposed
procedural and substantive requirements with the aim of
22 See Hanson & Bussiere, supra note 21, at 357 (stating "[1ow rates of recidivism
can, nevertheless, be worrisome, given the serious effects of sexual victimization"); see
also Eric S. Janus, and Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment with
Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443
(2003) (discussing an empirical study concerning sex offenders and recidivism rates).
23 See Robert Billbrey, Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators: A Misguided
Attempt to Solve a Serious Problem, 55 J. Mo. B. 321, 321 (1999) (recounting the story of
Larry Don McQuay, another notorious sex offender who throughout his lifetime
acknowledges molesting approximately 240 children and recognizing these types of stories
as a likely reason for the increase in the number of approaches towards this problem); see
also Stacy Russell, Comment, Castration Of Repeat Sexual Offenders: An International
Comparative Analysis, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L 425 (1997) (stating that "[m]any states have
proposed some type of legislation regarding castration for sexual offenders ... [flor
example, in Texas, a voluntary castration bill for repeat sexual offenders was
introduced...").
24 See Stephen J. Morse, Preventive Confinement of Dangerous Offenders, 32 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 56, 57 (2004) (noting that "[tihe desire to be safe ultimately conflicts with
and complements the desire to be free ... [b]ut achieving the safety that makes freedom
possible inevitably requires substantial infringement on the liberty of dangerous agents");
see also Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 VA. L. REV.
1025 (2002) (articulating the legal limbo sexual predators fall in regards to criminal law
theories of punishment and how a minority of states have taken action to fill the void by
enacting indefinite involuntary civil confinement for sexual predators).
25 See Morse, Preventive Confinement of Dangerous Offenders, supra note 24, at 56
(identifying these dueling objectives); see also Recent Cases, Constitutional Law - Due
Process (excused) - Minnesota Supreme Court Upholds Minnesota Sexually Dangerous
Persons Act - In Re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1999), 113 HARV. L. REV. 1228, 1228
(2000) (articulating this as "a delicate issue because it requires courts to balance society's
safety against the need for adequate procedural and substantive protections for the
offender.").
26 See Morse, supra note 24, at 62 (noting "how could it be fair to hold responsible and
punish a [sexual predator] for yielding to urges that are impossible or supremely difficult
to control? Control or volitional problems should be abandoned as legal criteria on both
conceptual scientific grounds"); see also Recent Cases, supra note 25, at 1228 (explaining
that this difficulty results in both goals being undermined).
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striking a fair balance between the State's legitimate concerns
and the individual's interests.27
The most common tools used to protect society and especially
children from sex offenders are sex offender registration laws
known as "Megan's laws."28  Megan's laws require the
registration of sex offenders who will be living in a community
after they are released from prison as well as the notification of
the community where they will be living.29 Like the Washington
Sexual Predator act, the original Megan's law was enacted in
response to a gruesome sex crime committed against a child.30
Less than a year after the rape and murder of a seven year old
girl in New Jersey by a two-time convicted sex offender, the State
of New Jersey enacted the nation's first statewide sex offender
registration statute in early 1995.31 Today all fifty states have
enacted sex offender registration laws 32 and there is also a
27 See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997) (stating that substantive
due process requires a finding of dangerousness coupled with some "metal abnormality"
or "personality disorder"); see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979) (holding
that a mid level burden of proof properly promotes this balance).
28 See Ernie Allen & Nadine Strossen, Debate: Megan's Law and the Protection of the
Child In the On-Line Age, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1319, 1320-21 (1998) (explaining how the
death of ten year old Megan Kanka led to the passing of legislation against sex offenders);
see also Patricia L. Petrucelli, Comment, Megan's Law: Branding The Sex Offender or
Benefiting the Community?, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1127, 1127-28 (1995) (describing
the original Megan's law as being indicative of the government's efforts to protect its
citizens and particularly its children).
29 See Billbrey, supra note 23, at 321 (explaining the notification process); see also
Petrucelli, supra note 28, at 1130-34 (explaining the multi-tiered process of the Megan's
Law, and the notification process).
30 See Petrucelli, supra note 28, at 1127 (depicting the actions of Jesse
Timmendequas, a convicted sex offender who unbeknownst to Megan Kanka or her
parents had moved across the street from her home and subsequently lured Megan into
his house and sexually assaulted Megan prior to killing her); see also Tracey A. Van
Wickler, H.B. 2564: The Real Estate Disclosure Act Threatens Arizona's Children with
Becoming "Megan" Victims, 32 AIZ. ST. L.J. 367, 368 (2000) (describing a detailed
account of Megan Kanka's death by Jesse Timmendequas).
31 See Allen & Strossen, supra note 28, at 1320-21 (stating that "[plublic outrage
about Megan's murder was immediate, intense, and inevitably political ... [w]ithin two
weeks New Jersey's governor and the State General Assembly were considering bills...");
see also Petrucelli, supra note 28, at 1128 (describing New Jersey's swift action in
response to the murder of seven year old Megan Kanka).
32 See David M. Boyers, Review of Selected 1996 California Legislation: Criminal
Procedure: Emotion Over Reason: California's New Community Notification and Chemical
Castration Laws Feel Good, but Fail "Sensible" Scrutiny, 28 PAC. L. J. 740, 743 (1997)
(explaining that all fifty states have some form of notice laws); see also Friedland, supra
note 13, at 76 (explaining "[a]ll fifty states now have some form of registration and notice
laws").
2007] CIVIL CONFINEMENT OF SEXUAL PREDATORS
federal statute requiring uniform sex offender registration in all
fifty states. 33
The issue of sex offender recidivism has also become a topic of
political debate and has as a result become a campaign issue
nationwide. 34 Although other approaches may help prevent
future crimes, they do not have the potential to reduce recidivism
in the same way that civil confinement does. As a result, some
experts believe that the only way to address this problem is
through incapacitation. 35 However, although civil confinement
may be more effective at preventing future crimes it also has
much greater costs against the liberty interests of past offenders
than do these other approaches.
C. The Rise of Sexually Violent Predator Statutes
Every state has a statute for the civil commitment of
individuals with mental illness.36 However, these laws are
normally used only in situations where an individual suffers from
a severe psychiatric illness and the person's symptoms put them
at an imminent risk of serious physical harm.37 Additionally, this
33 See Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender
Registration Program Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006) (establishing uniform sex offender
registration in all fifty states); Allen & Strossen, supra note 28, at 1321 (noting that
President Clinton signed a Congressional version in 1996); see also Petrucelli, supra note
28, at 1136-37 (clarifying that the federal statute permits but does not require the police
to notify a community if a released pedophile or rapist will be living in their community
only where there is a threat to the public and stating that the statute requires States to
enact similar statutes within three years or lose certain forms of federal funding).
34 See Janus & Prentky, supra note 22, at 1443 (discussing different empirical studies
concerning sex offender recidivism rates); see also Gregory Roberts, Sex Offender Issue
Used o Pan for Votes, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, March 23, 2006, at B1 (identifying
harsher penalties for sexual offenses against children as a major campaign issue).
35 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (2006) (noting that "[Kansas] legislature
determine[d] that a separate involuntary civil commitment process for the potentially
long-term control, care and treatment of sexually violent predators [was] necessary");
Friedland, supra note 13, at 82 (explaining "some experts maintain that the chronicity of
the problem can only be deterred through incapacitation and removal of offenders from
society at large.").
36 See Fitch, supra note 10, at 489. This is in effect the involuntary hospitalization of
an individual with a mental illness. See Paul F. Stavis, Civil Commitment: Past, Present
and Future, Address Before the National Conference of the National Alliance for the
Mentally Ill, (July 21, 1995), available at http://www.cqcapd.state.ny.us/counselscorner
/cc64.htm. This notes that "[a]t the present time every state in the United States has a
statute permitting person to be committed because they pose a danger to themselves or
others."
37 See Billbrey, supra note 23, at 323-24. The author discusses the punishment the
Supreme Court issued in Kansas v. Hendricks, citing to the Court which held that the
finding of the offender's violent nature alone was insufficient and that a mental
abnormality or personality disorder is necessary so that it made it difficult for the
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type of commitment is normally for a short period of time.38 Most
states also have laws providing for the civil confinement of
individuals charged with a crime and found incompetent to stand
trial or found to be not criminally culpable due to legal
insanity. 39 In such situations, those individuals incompetent to
stand trial are discharged once they have improved to the point
that they no longer meet incompetancy standards while those
found not criminally responsible generally are released through
conditional release programs as their condition improves. 40
In the past twenty years a new waive of civil commitment laws
specifically targeting sexually violent predators has emerged. 41
These sex offender commitment laws were enacted because
standard civil confinement statutes proved inadequate to handle
the problem of sexual predators. 42 This is mainly due to the
notion that sexual predators are not "mentally ill" in the manner
required by traditional civil confinement statutes. 43 Moreover,
offender to control their behavior. See Fitch, supra note 10, at 489. These laws may be
used for individuals with disorders such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.
38 See Billbrey, supra note 23, at 324-25. Billbrey chronicles the procedural events of
Missouri's sex offender statute in placing a sexually violent predator into a mental
facility. See Fitch, supra note 10, at 489. The individual is typically released once the
symptoms remit, thus eliminating the risk and as a result, hospital stays for such
patients rarely exceed thirty days in length.
39 See Fitch, supra note 10, at 489-90. Fitch notes the strictness of these laws which
ensures that they are only used for the confinement of individuals with the most serious
of disorders. See generally Editorial, Life Tough For Offenders? Awww, DAYTON DAILY
NEWS, March 20, 2006, at A8. The author discusses the issue of punishment and
sentencing for sex offenders and dismisses the sentiment for weaker penalties, arguing for
harsher penalties.
40 See Fitch, supra note 10, at 490. Those who do not sufficiently improve or are
unlikely to do so normally must be released for confinement under normal civil
commitment laws. See Morse, supra note 24, at 61. Morse analyzes the ill-fitting courts
use for disposing of sexual predators when he states "[u]nless personality disorder or
mental abnormality produces a lack of control, the causal link between abnormality and
predation does no legal justificatory work .... "
41 See Billbrey, supra note 23, at 325-26 (explaining the alternative methods to
involuntary civil confinement); see also Fitch, supra note 10, at 490 (explaining the failure
of similar types of laws in the 1960s and the reemergence of sexual predator commitment
laws in the 1990s).
42 See In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1009 (Wash., 1993) (finding that "the Legislature
expressly noted that the involuntary commitment statute... was an inadequate remedy
because confinement prevented any overt act"); see also Eric S. Janus, Sex Offender
Commitments: Debunking the Official Narrative and Revealing the Rules-in-Use, 8 STAN.
L. & POLY REV. 71, 72 (1997) (explaining that sexual predator commitment laws were
enacted precisely for this reason).
43 See Janus, supra note 42, at 72 (noting that "[t]he targets of sexual predator
commitment acts do not have this same appearance of mental illness that is required by
traditional commitment statutes"); see generally Robert M. Wettstein, A psychiatric
Perspective on Washington's Sexually Violent Predators Statute, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L.
[Vol. 22:1
2007] CIVIL CONFINEMENT OF SEXUAL PREDATORS
sexual predators are not suited for the type of short-term civil
commitment utilized for those who are mentally ill due to the
personality features predisposing them towards future acts. 44
Many state legislatures have been persuaded to enact sex
offender commitment statutes as a result of public outcry over
incidents of sexual violence.45
D. The Confinement Process
Sexually violent predator commitment laws provide procedures
by which the most dangerous sexual predators can be
incapacitated and treated after they have completed their prison
sentences. Although the procedures vary from state to state, the
steps involved are similar throughout the country. Normally, the
process begins when a particular agency or state authority46 files
a petition within a certain period of time prior to the SVP's
scheduled release from criminal confinement.47 The length of
time in advance of the individual's release in which this must be
done varies by jurisdiction.48 This process is not limited to just
REV., 597 (1992) (stating that the targets of sex offender commitments do not appear to be
"mentally ill" in the traditional sense of civil commitment).
44 See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (West 2006) (stating that "involuntary
treatment.., which is intended to be a short-term civil commitment system that is
primarily designed to provide short-term treatment to individuals with serious mental
disorders and then return them to the community"); see also Jennifer M. Connor, Note,
Seling v. Young: Constitutionally Protected But Unjust Civil Commitment For Sexually
Violent Predators, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 511, 515 (2001-02) (stating that
"[d]ue to these personality features, such persons are not suited to short-term civil
commitments which are appropriate for other with mental disorders.").
45 See Claudine M. Leone, New Jersey Assembly Bill 155- A Bill Allowing the Civil
Commitment of Violent Sex Offenders After the Completion of a Criminal Sentence, 18
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 890, 890 (1994) (describing community's outrage over release of
violent sex offender); see also Deborah L. Morris, Note, Constitutional Implications of the
Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators: A Due Process Analysis, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 594, 595 (1997) (stating that "[p]ublic outcry over ever increasing of
sexual violence encouraged a number of state legislatures to enact laws requiring the
involuntary commitments of sexual predators.").
46 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3702(A) (2006) (stating that an agency has jurisdiction
over the person); see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 207/10(a) (West's Smith-Hurd 2006)
(defining the agency as referred to in the Act as "the agency with the authority or duty to
release or discharge the person").
47 See e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 36-3702(A) (2006) (allowing the agency to submit a
written request "to the attorney general not more than one hundred eighty days and not
less than thirty days before the person's anticipated release"); see also 725 ILL. COMP.
STAT. § 207/10(b) (West's Smith-Hurd 2006) (stating that "the agency with jurisdiction
shall inform the Attorney General and the State's Attorney in a position to file a
petition ... regarding the person as possible...").
48 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03(a)(1) (2006) (stating the agency with jurisdiction
must give written notice to the attorney general ninety days prior to release); see also
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those serving sentences for convictions but also includes
individuals who have been confined as incompetent to stand trial
and those who were found guilty although legally insane.49
After this initial petition has been filed a process is commenced
leading to a commitment hearing that is not unlike a criminal
proceeding in the various protections provided. In some states an
initial hearing may be held to determine whether there is
probable cause to believe the individual is a sexually violent
predator and thus eligible for commitment under the act.50 At
this hearing the defendant is afforded numerous procedural
protections. 51 If probable cause is found the person will then
undergo an evaluation in order to determine whether he or she is
a sexually violent predator,52 otherwise the petition will be
dismissed. 53 If probable cause is found a trial must be conducted
WIS. STAT § 980.015(2) (2006) (requiring the notification to the District Attorney of the
state's intention to confine as soon as possible beginning three months prior to release).
49 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03(a)(1) (2006) (allowing confinement petitions to be
filed ninety days prior to release from total confinement, of an individual found
incompetent to stand trial, or of a person found not guilty by reason of insanity or not
guilty by reason that he suffered from a particular disease or defect which rendered him
incapable of possessing the required criminal intent); see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
207/10(b) (West's Smith-Hurd 2006) (allowing petition beginning three months prior to
release from total confinement or anticipated entry into a mandatory supervised release
program, those adjudicated delinquent under state statutes or the discharge of those
found not guilty by reason of insanity).
50 See ILL. COMP. STAT. § 207/30(b) (West's Smith-Hurd 2006) (requiring a court
hearing to determine probable cause whenever a petition is filed); see also KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-29a05(a) (2006) (providing for a probable cause hearing in which the judge will
"determine whether probable cause exists to believe that the person named in the petition
is a sexually violent predator").
51 See ARiz. REV. STAT. § 36-3705(a) (2006) (giving the defendant notice and the
opportunity to appear at a probable cause hearing and additionally the right at hearing to
present evidence on his own behalf, cross-examine witnesses against him, and view and
copy all documents and reports in the court file); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a05(E)
(2006) (granting the defendant the following rights "(1) To be represented by counsel; (2)
to present evidence on such person's behalf; (3) to cross-examine witnesses who testify
against such person; and (4) to view and copy all petitions and reports in the court file").
52 See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 36-3705(G) (2006) (noting that "[i]f at the hearing the court
reaffirms that probable cause exists to believe the person is a sexually violent person, the
judge shall order an evaluation as to whether the person is a sexually violent person"); see
also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a05(d) (2006) (providing for an evaluation as to whether the
individual is a sexually violent predator "by a person deemed to be professionally
qualified to conduct such an examination").
53 See CAL. WELF & INST. CODE § 6602 (2006) (stating that if probable cause is lacking
the judge shall dismiss the petition); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3705(F) (2006)
(holding that if "the court determines probable cause does not exist to believe that the
person is a sexually violent person, the court shall dismiss the petition.").
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within a certain period of time to determine the person's status
as a sexually violent predator. 54
The protections provided at trial also vary from state to state.
Many states provide the defendant with the right to have this
trial before a jury.55 The defendant in such proceedings is
additionally entitled to representation by counsel and must be
provided with one if indigent.56 In several states, the individual
has the right to retain experts and professionals to perform an
evaluation on their behalf.57 The individual remains confined
during the trial process. 58 At trial the state will have the ability
to introduce evidence of past offenses, 59 although this evidence
alone will not be sufficient to prove that the individual is a
sexually violent predator.60 In most states the individual must be
shown to be a sexually violent predator beyond a reasonable
54 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3706 (2006) (requiring a trial be conducted within one
hundred twenty days of the filing of a petition under the act); WASH. REV. CODE §
71.09.010 (2006) (providing for a trial within forty-five days after the completion of a
probable cause hearing).
55 See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (2006) (giving the individual, the prosecuting
attorney, or the judge to right to demand a trial by jury and providing that absent such a
demand the trial will be conducted before a court); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a06 (2006)
(affording the right to demand a trial by jury at least four days prior to trial to the person,
the attorney general or the judge and stating "[i]f no demand is made, the trial shall be
before the court").
56 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a06(b) (2006) (providing for the court to appoint
counsel for the individual's assistance if indigent); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3704(C)
(2006) (explaining that "the person who is named in the petition is entitled to assistance
of counsel at any proceeding that is conducted pursuant to this article. If the person is
indigent, the court shall appoint counsel to assist the person").
57 See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.050 (2006) (describing the state's procedure with
regards to the defendant retaining experts and other professionals); see also ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 36-3703(A) (2006) (maintaining that "if a person [defendant] is subject to an
examination.. each party [defendant included] may select a competent professional to
perform simultaneous evaluations of the person [defendant].").
58 See CALF. WELF. & INST CODE § 6602(a) (2006) (stating "the judge shall order that
the person remain in custody in a secure facility until a trial is completed"); see also ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 36-3705(B) (2006) (mandating that "if the judge determines that probable
cause exists to believe that the person named in the petition is a sexually violent person,
the judge shall order that the person be detained in a licensed facility under the
supervision of the superintendent of the Arizona state hospital.").
59 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 207/35(b) (2006) (allowing evidence of the commission of
crimes and punishments received to be admitted in the civil commitment trial); see also
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3704(B) (2006) (holding that the court may admit evidence of "past
acts that would constitute a sexual offense").
60 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 207/35(e) (2006) (explaining that evidence that the
defendant "was convicted for or committed sexually violent offenses before committing the
offense or act on which the petition is based is not sufficient to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that the person has a mental disorder"); see also STAT. ANN. § 980.05(4)
(1998 & Supp. 2006) (effective Aug. 1, 2006) (maintaining that evidence that indicates
that the defendant committed prior sexually motivated acts is not sufficient to establish
that the person has a mental disorder).
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doubt.61 Once the jury or the court makes this determination, the
person will incapacitated for treatment 62 or where available may
be considered for a less restrictive alternative as appropriate. 63 If
the person is not found to be a sexually violent predator, he will
be released unless lawfully confined for some other reason. 64
Once an individual has been committed as a sexually violent
predator he is entrusted to the custody of a designated state
authority for treatment. 65 Although the duration of commitment
is indefinite, in many states the person will not be kept for more
than a year without being reevaluated. 66 Additionally, certain
procedures exist which allow a person to petition for release at
any time that authority believes the person's condition has
improved, no longer classifying the person as a sexually violent
predator. 67 Once a person is no longer a high risk to re-offend, he
61 See CALF. WELF. & INST CODE § 6604 (2006) (providing "[t]he court or jury shall
determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the person is a sexually violent
predator"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a) (2006) (requiring proof that an individual is a
sexually violent predator beyond a reasonable doubt).
62 See CALF. WELF. & INST CODE § 6600 (stating that when the court or jury finds an
individual to be a sexually violent predator beyond a reasonable doubt, "the person shall
be committed for two years to the custody of the State Department of Mental Health for
appropriate treatment and confinement in a secure facility"); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. §
36-3707(B) (2006) (explaining that following a determination that the defendant is a
sexually violent person, the court may place the defendant with a licensed facility to
"receive care, supervision or treatment until the person's mental disorder has so changed
that the person would not be a threat to public safety").
63 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3707(B)(2) (2006) (allowing an individual found to
be a sexually violent predator to be released to a less restrictive alternative under the
terms of the act); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.090(i)(B) (2006) (stating that a person
can petition the court for conditional release or unconditional discharge).
64 See WISC. STAT. ANN. § 980.05(5) (1998 & Supp. 2006) (effective Aug. 1, 2006)
(providing that the person be committed under the act upon the court or jury finding
beyond a reasonable doubt that he is a sexually violent predator and released if proof is
insufficient); see also IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.7(8) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005) (providing
for release if jury determines innocence).
65 See FLA. STAT. § 394.917(2) (West 2006) (stating that after a determination is made
"the person shall be committed to the custody of the Department of Children and Family
Services for control, care, and treatment until such time as the person's mental
abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that it is safe for the person to be at
large"); see also Mo. ANN. STAT. § 632.495(2) (Vernon 2000) (providing that after jury
determination, the "person shall be committed to the custody of the director of the
department of mental health").
66 See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 207/55(a) (West's Smith-Hurd 2004) (effective Aug.
6, 2004) (requiring a written report to the court within six months of initial confinement
and once per year thereafter to determine if the confined has made "sufficient progress to
be conditionally released or discharged"); see also WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.070
(West 2006) (providing for a mental examination at least once a year).
67 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3709(A) (2006) (allowing the confined to petition for
release or the director or superintendent to allow the person to petition for release if the
director "determines that the person's mental disorder has so changed that the person is
not likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if conditionally released to a less restrictive
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may be eligible for a less restrictive alternative or a conditional
release program.68
II. STATE POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Sources of State Power
The Supreme Court has recognized two sources of power under
which a state may confine individuals: state police power and
parens patriae power.69 Some civil confinement statutes may be
justified under both of these sources of power, as they are not
mutually exclusive. 70  In Addington v. Texas,71  the Court
recognized the state's authority to civilly confine individuals
pursuant to these powers. 72 Although an individual may be
confined based on either of these powers, the purposes for which
a state may act under the authority of each of these powers is
very different. 73 This distinction is especially important given
that the principle motivation for sexual predator commitment
statutes is different from that of standard civil confinement
statutes.74
alternative"); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.09.090(1)(A-B) ( West 2000 & Supp
2005) (effective May 9, 2005) (providing that if the secretary determines the person is no
longer a sexually violent predator, conditional release may be permitted).
68 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3709(A) (2006) (allowing "conditional release" to a "less
restrictive alternative"); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.09.090(1)(A-B) (West 2000 &
Supp 2005) (effective May 9, 2005) (authorizing conditional release to a "less restrictive
alternative" if it is in the "best interest of the person" and the community can be
adequately protected).
69 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979) (stating that "[t]he state has a
legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens who
are unable because of emotional disorders to care for themselves; the state also has
authority under its police power to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies
of some who are mentally ill."); see also Morris, supra note 45, at 624 (describing the two
sources of state power).
70 See Eric S. Janus, Sexual Predator Commitment Laws: Lessons for Law and the
Behavioral Sciences, 18 BEHAV. Sdi. & L. 5, 6 (2000) (explaining these two sources of state
power); see generally Morris, supra note 45, at 624-28 (detailing the distinctions between
the state's parens patriae and their police power).
71 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
72 Id. at 426 (explicating these two forms of power and the purposes of each).
73 See id. (recognizing the State interest under parens patriae power to provide care
to those unable to care for themselves and its authority under its police power to protect
society); see also Morris, supra note 45, at 624 (outlining the two state powers).
74 See Janus, supra note 42, at 72 (arguing that while traditional civil confinement
statutes have benign parens patriae justifications, sexual predator commitment laws do
not possess such a benign motive); see also Janus & Logan, supra, note 11, at 356 (arguing
that "it has never been argued that modern SVP laws are characterized in any manner by
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i. State Police Power
Pursuant to its police power, the state may act "to protect the
general health, safety, and well-being of society."75 Two common
examples of the state exercising its police power are the criminal
law and public health regulations. 76 Pursuant to its police
powers, a state can limit a person's freedom for the protection of
society. 77  The Supreme Court has held that in certain
circumstances, the state's interest in public safety might
outweigh an individual's liberty interest.78 Consequently, in the
sexual predator context, the state can incapacitate a mentally ill
individual in order to protect society from his dangerous sexual
tendencies. 79 However, the police power is subject to the
limitations of the Constitution. 80 In the aftermath of Hendricks,
the Court seems to have concluded that civil confinement relying
solely on state police power is constitutionally permissible.81
benign parens patriae considerations, and therefore this limited justification for custodial
confinement has no applicability.").
75 Janus, supra note 70, at 6 (explaining state police power); see BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1178 (7th ed. 1999) (defining police power as "A state's Tenth Amendment
right, subject to due-process and other limitations, to establish and enforce laws
protecting the public's health, safety, and general welfare, or to delegate this right to local
governments.").
76 See Janus, supra note 70, at 6 (mentioning these two "classic examples of police
power interventions"); see also Morris, supra note 45, at 627-28 (giving examples of state
police powers including convicting criminals and promoting "order, safety, security,
health, morals and general welfare...").
77 See Janus, supra note 42, at 72 (stating that a "key use of civil commitment has
been to protect the public from dangerous individuals"); see also Morris, supra note 45, at
627 (recognizing the legitimacy of this state action).
78 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) (stating such and giving
examples of situations in which community safety can outweigh an individual's liberty
interest); see also Elizabeth A. Weeks, Note, The Newly Found "Compassion" for Sexually
Violent Predators: Civil Commitment and the Right To Treatment in The Wake of Kansas
v. Hendricks, 32 GA. L. REV. 1261, 1284 (1998) (stating "a state's interest in protecting the
public health and safety of the population as a whole justifies depriving a single
individual's liberty.").
79 See Addington, 441 U.S. at 426 (saying that the state has authority to protect
communities from dangerous mentally ill persons); see also Weeks, supra note 78, at 1284
(adducing that the policing power of the state may incapacitate mentally ill individuals to
protect society).
80 See Addington, 441 U.S. at 425 (stating the civil commitment requires "due process
protection"); see also Morris, supra note 45, at 627-28 (recognizing that state's policing
power is subject to Constitutional limitations).
81 See Janus, supra note 70, at 12 (evaluating the absence of a discussion of the
parens patriae power in Hendricks); see also Weeks, supra note 78, at 1284 (some courts
"assert that police power alone may justify indefinite preventative detention").
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Thus, this may give the states more freedom when civilly
confining individuals than they previously enjoyed. 82
ii. Parens Patriae Power
Another justification for state civil confinement laws is the
parens patriae power.8 3 This source of power illustrates the state
as a guardian of individuals under legal disability.84 Examples of
the use of parens patriae power include guardianship laws and
traditional civil confinement statutes. 85 This state power is often
acted upon in the civil context as the state acts for the purposes
of protecting an ill individual. 86 Thus, the use of parens patriae
justifications for sex offender civil confinement is difficult
because sex offenders are not normally "incompetent" in the way
traditionally required for confinement.8 7  However, the
confinement of sexual predators for treatment aimed at their
general health and welfare may still be constitutional under
parens patriae powers. 88
82 See Janus, supra note 70, at 12 (clarifying that "police power itself entails no limits
other than dangerousness"); see also Weeks, supra note 78 at 1299 (illustrating that
through the Hendricks decision, the Supreme Court created a "loophole through which
states can keep prior sex offenders off the streets indefinitely").
83 See Janus, supra note 70, at 6 (identifying this source of state power); see also
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004) (describing parens patriae as "the state in
its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves").
84 See Morris, supra note 45, at 624 (explaining that parens patriae power "embodies
the notion that the state must care for individuals incapable of caring for themselves");
see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004) (defining parens patriae).
85 See Janus, supra note 70 at 6 (noting that parens patriae "authorizes the state to
protect individuals who are unable to help themselves"); see also Christine Steib Stickler,
Note, In Re S.G.: Parens Patriae and Wardship Proceedings-Exactly Who in the State
Should Determine the Best Interest of the Child, 7 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 377, 379 (1998)
(stating "[tihe parens patriae doctrine provides the state with the general power of
guardianship over children and other persons with legal disabilities.").
86 See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 96 (1992). The state acts in the civil context
in large part for the purposes of protecting and providing for these individuals. See
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979). This case states that "[t]he state has a
legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens who
are unable because of emotional disorders to care for themselves."
87 See Janus, supra note 70, at 6-7 (explaining "sex offender commitment schemes
cannot be supported by classic parens patriae arguments"); see also Weeks, supra note 78,
at 1272 (stating "[t]he two state purposes most commonly asserted to justify civil
commitment are protection of society under the state's police power and protection of an
incompetent individual under the parens patriae power.").
88 See generally Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (discussing the state's
right to use its parens patriae powers on various individuals); see also Morris, supra note
45, at 625 (acknowledging the Court's willingness to accept this justification).
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B. The Distinction between acts civil in nature and acts criminal
in nature
Along with the two sources of state power discussed above,
there are two distinct categories of government action under
which states exercise these powers.8 9 The major difference
between these two types of state action is the aims the state
seeks to advance through these types of laws. 90 The distinction
between laws aimed to punish and laws aimed at civil remedies
lies at the heart of many challenges to civil confinement
statutes.91 States thus must prove their civil intent in order to
defeat challenges rooted in the constitutional protections
implicated by criminal processes and punishments.92
i. Punitive/ Criminal laws
Criminal laws are intended to punish and, thus, serve the two
traditional goals of punishment: retribution and deterrence. 93
Criminal statutes are retroactive in nature as they punish a past
act for which the offender is culpable.94 Additionally, although
criminal punishment can utilize incapacitation as a preventative
device, this incapacitation must be proportional to an individual's
89 See Richard P. Ieyoub, Symposium, State Attorney General Actions, the Tobacco
Litigation, and the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1859, 1864 (2000)
(discussing that parens patriae can be used in both civil and criminal actions); see also
Janus, supra note 70, at 6 (describing this distinction as the two "modes" in which state
power is exercised).
90 See Todd M. Grossman, Comment, Kansas v. Hendricks: The Diminishing Role of
Treatment in the Involuntary Civil Confinement of Sexually Dangerous Persons, 33 NEW
ENG.L. REV. 475, 477-78 (1999) (distinguishing civil and criminal aims); see also Janus,
supra note 70, at 6 (explaining the differing intents of criminal and civil laws).
91 See, e.g., Kan. v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997). Hendricks challenged his
confinement in part based on it being criminal for purposes of the Ex Post Facto and
Double Jeopardy clauses. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368 (1986). The petitioner in
Allen challenged his confinement on the grounds that the proceeding was criminal in
nature for purposes of the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause.
92 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369 (stating "[olur conclusion that the Act is
nonpunitive thus removes an essential prerequisite for both Hendricks' double jeopardy
and ex post facto claims."); see also Grossman, supra note 90, at 477 (acknowledging that
a statute must be civil in nature in order to avoid certain constitutional problems).
93 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-62 (discussing that the two primary objectives of
criminal punishment are retribution and deterrence); see also Grossman, supra note 90,
at 478 (identifying these twin goals of punishment).
94 See Allen, 478 U.S. at 371. This case discussed that if an act does not try to prevent
past misdeeds, it is not criminal in nature. See also Janus, supra note 70, at 6. Note that
the act be done with a guilty mind and thus where the act is done with an insane mind
this culpability is lacking.
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blameworthiness for a particular act.95 Due to the deprivation of
liberty involved, criminal proceedings and punishments require
unique procedural protections 96 and implicate substantive rights
which are not of concern in civil proceedings. 97
ii. Laws civil in nature
Civil schemes are intended to serve civil goals of incapacitation
and treatment, but not punishment. 98 Unlike criminal laws, civil
statutes are prospective, seeking to prevent future harm. 99 In
order to avoid implicating various constitutional protections,
sexual predator statutes must be civil in nature.lO0 Thus, a
common question when courts analyze civil confinement
questions is whether they are merely a camouflaged form of
punishment.101 As a result, most states stress the punitive intent
of their sexual predator statutes, sometimes explicitly.102 The
95 See Russell L. Christopher, Article, Time and Punishment, 66 Ohio St. L.J. 269,
270-71 (2005) (noting that under retributivism, only punishments deserved and
proportional are justified); see also Janus, supra note 70, at 5, 6 (noting that
incapacitation is nonetheless triggered by a blameworthy act which the confined has
committed).
96 See United States v. Klein, 474 F. Supp. 1243, 1246 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating
that the prosecution must prove the crime beyond a reasonable doubt); see also Janus,
supra note 70, at 6 (including in these procedural protections is the required burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
97 See Florida v. A.C., 714 So. 2d. 617, 619 (Fl. Ct. App. 4th dist. 1998) (stating that "a
law violates the ex post facto clause of the constitution only if it punishes as a crime an
act which was not a crime when committed, makes the punishment for a crime more
onerous than it was at commission, or deprives one charged with a crime of a defense
available when the crime was committed"); see also Janus, supra note 70, at 6 (noting that
criminal proceedings must not violate the Ex Post Facto clause or the right against self-
incrimination).
98 See Grossman, supra note 90, at 478 (articulating these goals); see also Carla B.
Keegan, Comment, Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Statute: Constitutionally
Sound and the Best Alternative for the Problem of Violent Predators, 20 SEATTLE UNIV. L.
R. 157, 167 (1996) (discussing that the two civil goals of incapacitation and treatment).
99 See Janus, supra note 70, at 6 (emphasizing that past behavior is nonetheless
relevant as an evidentiary factor for purposes of diagnosis and prediction); see also Lief
Kjehl Rasmussen, Note and Comment, Abolishing the Privity Doctrine in Texas-Just Do
It!, 2 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 559, 574 (1996) (noting that civil liability should exist if the
liability will prevent future harm).
100 See In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1023-24 (Wash. 1993) (Johnson, J., dissenting)
(arguing that a criminal sexual predator statute is "fundamentally flawed"); see also
Grossman, supra note 90, at 478 (stating that a civil statute must not aim to punish).
101 See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan. 1996) (stating that the legislature
has given the state several options rather than "camouflaging statutes"); see also
Grossman, supra note 90, at 478 (identifying this common concern that civil confinement
statutes might intend to remedy shortcomings of criminal punishment).
102 See e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (2006) (stressing the need for "a separate
involuntary civil commitment process for the potentially long-term control, care and
treatment of sexually violent predators") (emphasis added); see also Kansas v. Hendricks,
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Supreme Court has viewed this question as one primarily of
statutory constructionl0 3 and thus has given deference to the
legislature's stated intent. 104
C. Constitutional Concerns
Critics of civil confinement laws often base their opposition on
their opinions that the laws violate various constitutional
protections.105 Many challenges to civil confinement statutes are
based at least in part on the Due Process clause. Additionally,
individuals have challenged civil commitment laws on the
grounds that they are criminal rather than civil in nature and
thus implicate the various protections provided by the
constitution in the context of criminal prosecutions and process.
i. Due Process Clause
The protections of the Due Process Clause are implicated in
any confinement proceeding regardless of the civil or criminal
nature of the act. The Due Process clause guarantees that an
individual will not be deprived of "life, liberty or property without
due process of the law".106 Since civil confinement laws involve a
deprivation of liberty for an indefinite period of time, the due
process clause protections must be met. 107 As a result challenges
to civil confinement statutes are often based in part on
521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997) (finding evidence of Kansas' intent that the act be civil in nature
in its placement in the Kansas probate code rather than the criminal code).
103 See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368 (1986) (stating "[tihe question whether a
particular proceeding is criminal for the purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause is first
of all a question of statutory construction"); see also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361 (citing
Allen for this proposition).
104 See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (stating since the court normally defers
to the legislature's stated intent, only the "clearest proof' will suffice to override
legislative intent and prove the act punitive in nature); see also Hendricks, 521 U.S. at
361 (stating the court "ordinarily defers to the legislature's stated intent").
105 See Bilbrey, supra note 23, at 322 (introducing this argument); see also Jeremiah
White, Is Iowa's Sexual Predator Statute "Civil'? The Civil Commitment of Sexually
Violent Predators After Kansas v. Crane, 89 IOWA L. REV. 739, 749-50 (2004) (noting
petitioners constitutional arguments of double jeopardy, ex post facto and substantive due
process were rejected in Kansas).
106 U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
107 See e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (stating "[t]his Court
repeatedly has recognized that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant
deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection"); see also Jackson v. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (concluding that the nature and duration of the commitment
must "bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is
committed").
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substantive due process.OS The Supreme Court has imposed
various requirements on civil confinement statutes in order to
ensure that these protections are met. For example, the Court
has held that due process requires that the burden of proof in
civil confinement cases be higher than mere preponderance of the
evidence.109 Additionally, the Court has required certain findings
to be made in order for a government to civilly confine a
defendant. These include (1) a mental abnormality or personality
disorder, (2) that this condition renders him likely to commit
future acts of violence, and (3) an inability to control behavior.'lO
ii. Other constitutional concerns
In addition to the due process clause, several other
constitutional provisions have been relied on to challenge civil
confinement laws."' Two provisions often relied upon by those
challenging civil confinement laws are the ex post factoil 2 clause
and the double jeopardy clause.113 The ex post facto clause
protects an individual from being punished by a law made
effective retroactively1 4 and thus in order to prevail on such a
challenge the petitioner must prove the criminal nature of the
108 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997) (stating Hendricks challenged
the statute on substantive due process grounds); see also Bilbrey supra note 23, at 322
(stating that many civil confinement cases are brought on due process grounds).
109 See Addington, 441 U.S. at 431. Although the Court required a burden of proof
greater than mere preponderance of the evidence, a standard as strong as the 'beyond a
reasonable doubt' standard employed in criminal cases was not necessary according to the
Court. See Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355, 364 (1972). The court
also required a higher burden of proof for based on civil confinement nature.
110 See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 422-23 (2002) (adding this third requirement);
see also Ellen F. Carey, Dangerous Sex Offenders and Volitional Control: Due Process
Clause Does Not Require Complete Lack of Volition for Involuntary Civil Commitment- -
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002), 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 591, 591 (noting that Crane,
534 U.S. 407 did not require proof of complete inability to control ones self, just some
inability to control).
111 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350. Hendricks challenged his confinement on double
jeopardy and ex post facto grounds, in addition to his due process claims. See Allen v.
Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 366 (1986). The petitioner in Allen challenged his confinement
based on the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
112 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. "No bill of attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. "No state shall.., pass any bill of attainder, ex post
facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility."
113 U.S. CONST. amend. V. (quoting "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb"); Janus, supra note 70, at 6
(commenting that "[c]riminal interventions.., invoke a unique set of rights and
immunities... [including] no double jeopardy.").
114 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 601 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "ex post facto law" as
"[a] law that applies retroactively, esp. in a way that negatively affects a person's rights,
as by criminalizing an action that was legal when it was committed.").
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act. 115 Ex Post Facto challenges are asserted when a party whose
confinement is sought by the state committed the acts leading to
the proceeding prior to the passage of the confinement act.116
These provisions have also been relied upon in challenges to state
sex offender registration laws.117 Challenges based on the Double
Jeopardy Clause, on the other hand, stem directly from the
nature of civil confinement statutes. Since the Double Jeopardy
Clause protects individuals from being tried for the same crime
twice, 118 they also rely on the punitive or civil nature of an act.
This type of claim could be brought in any situation where an
individual who has already been tried for his offenses is then
subjected to civil commitment proceedings, stemming from those
same crimes. 119
III. CIVIL CONFINEMENT JURISPRUDENCE
A. Foundations of Hendricks
Addington v. Texas120 is considered by many to be the first
modern Supreme Court case dealing with civil confinement. The
appellant in Addington challenged a Texas statute under which
his mother had petitioned to have him committed indefinitely to
a state mental hospital.121 The case directly addressed the
115 See Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 (1977), aff'd, 718 F.2d 1518 (11th Cir.
1983) (noting the law did not violate ex post facto clause because it did not make any
previously innocent act criminal); see also supra text accompanying notes 89-104
(discussing the difference between laws criminal and civil in nature).
116 See e.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 372 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("A law enacted
after commission of the offense and which punished the offense by extending the term of
confinement is a textbook example of an ex post facto law"); see also Dobbert, 432 U.S. at
292 (defining ex post facto violation as any law that makes a crime something that was
not criminal when committed).
117 See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003). The Court in Doe considered an Ex Post
Facto challenge to the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act. See Stogner v. California,
539 U.S. 607, 609 (2003). The court in Stogner considered a child abuse statute under ex
post facto law invalid.
118 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 491 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "double jeopardy" as
"protect[ing] against second prosecution for same offense after acquittal or conviction, and
against multiple punishments for same offense.").
119 See e.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361 (articulating Hendricks' claim that he was
being subjected to new "punishment" for acts for which he had already been convicted);
see also Seling v. Young, 532 U.S. 250, 257 (2001) (outlining cases in which petitioner
claimed double jeopardy based on their commitment or confinement).
120 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
121 Addington, 441 U.S. at 420. The appellant had been committed temporarily on
seven occasions between 1969 and 1975.
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question as to what standard of proof is required by the Due
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in a civil
proceeding brought under state law for the indefinite
commitment of an individual to a state mental hospital.122 The
Court found the "preponderance of the evidence" standard
required in most civil cases to be Constitutionally inadequate to
meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause because of the
magnitude of the individual's interest in a civil commitment
proceeding.123 However, the Court also concluded that a standard
as strict as the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard applied in
criminal cases was not necessary to meet due process
requirements.124 As a result, the Court held that the Texas
standard of "clear and convincing evidence" was sufficient to
meet Due Process requirements.125 Lastly, the Court recognized
the powers of a state to civilly confine those who are mentally
ill.126 In doing so the Court articulated the requirement that a
state acting pursuant to its police powers must show the
individual to be both dangerous and mentally ill.127
Seven years after Addington, the Court handed down a
landmark decision involving the civil confinement of sexual
predators. In Allen v. Illinois,128 the Court rejected a challenge
to the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act. 129 The petitioner,
Terry B. Allen, appealed the trial court's determination that he
was a "sexually dangerous person"130 as defined by the Act.1 3 1 In
122 Id. at 421-22 (identifying this issue).
123 Id. at 427 (reasoning "[tihe individual should not be asked to share equally with
society the risk of error when the possible injury to the individual is significantly greater
than any possible harm to the state.").
124 Id. at 432 (stating "the reasonable-doubt standard is inappropriate in civil
commitment proceedings because, given the uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis, it may
impose a burden the state cannot meet and thereby erect an unreasonable barrier to
needed medical treatment.").
125 Id. at 433 (concluding that "clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence" was
"adequate" standard).
126 Id. at 426 (stating "[tihe state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae
powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to
care for themselves; the state also has authority under its police power to protect the
community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill").
127 Id. (stating "[the state] has authority under its police power to protect the
community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill").
128 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
129 Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 207/1-99
(West's Smith-Hurd 2006).
130 See Allen, 478 U.S. at 366 (finding that the petitioner was a sexually dangerous
person under Act).
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reaching this determination the trial court relied on the
testimony of two psychiatrists who had examined Allen.132 Allen
argued that his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination was violated when the court allowed the
psychiatrists to testify at his confinement trial.133 In advancing
this argument, the petitioner contended that the Act was
punitive in nature.134 However, the court disagreed and ruled
that the Act was not criminal for Fifth Amendment purposes. 135
In reaching this decision the Court relied on the legislature's
stated civil purpose, the treatment provided, and the ability of
the individual to petition for release. 136
Less than a year after Allen, the Court decided an important
case dealing with substantive due process in civil confinement
cases. In U.S. v. Salerno,137 the Court concluded that in certain
circumstances the state's interest in public safety can outweigh
the individual liberty interest. 138 The Salerno case involved a
federal statute which allowed the court to detain arrestees prior
to trial where they conclude that no release conditions would
reasonably assure "the safety of any other person and the
community." 139 The government held Solerno pursuant to the act
without bail while his trial was pending.140 After the district
131 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 207/5(f) (West's Smith-Hurd 2006) (defining sexually
violent person as someone convicted of a sexually violent offense, adjudicated delinquent
for a sexually violent offense, or "has been found not guilty of a sexually violent offense by
reason of insanity" but remains dangerous due to a mental disorder).
132 See Allen, 479 U.S. at 366 (explaining the court's finding was "[biased upon the
testimony of the psychiatrists, as well as that of the victim of the sexual assault for which
petitioner had been indicted...").
133 Id. at 370-71. (noting that "[Allen] places great reliance on the fact that
proceedings under the Act are accompanied by procedural safeguards usually found in
criminal trials").
134 Id. at 370-71 (describing petitioner's arguments that the requirements that the
state must first file criminal charges against the person and that the person must have
committed an act of sexual assault or molestation indicate the act's criminal purpose).
135 Id. at 370 (noting that "[tihe discussion of civil commitment in Addington... this
Court concluded that the Texas involuntary-commitment scheme is not criminal insofar
as the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is concerned, fully supports our
conclusion here...").
136 Id. (concluding "[t]he Act thus does not appear to promote either of 'the traditional
aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence').
137 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
138 Id. at 748 (stating that "[w]e have repeatedly held that the Government's
regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an
individual's liberty interest.").
139 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2006).
140 See Salerno, 581 U.S. at 743 (noting that "[tihe District Court granted the
Government's detention motion, concluding that the Government had established by clear
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court determined that the government had met this burden of
showing that the safety of the community was threatened, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, and concluded
that allowing such pre-trial detention would violate substantive
due process.141 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
despite the importance of the individual liberty right, "this right
may, in circumstances where the government's interest is
sufficiently weighty, be subordinated to the greater needs of
society."142
Perhaps the most important case prior to Hendricks, however,
was decided by the Court in 1992.143 Foucha v. Louisiana144
involved the confinement of an individual who although no longer
suffering from mental illness remained confined because the
state could not "certify that he would not constitute a menace to
himself or others if released."14 5 The petitioner, Terry Foucha
was committed to a facility in 1984 after he was found not guilty
by reason of insanity of aggravated burglary and illegal discharge
of a firearm.146 At the time of trial, doctors determined that
Foucha was unable to distinguish right from wrong and was thus
insane at the time of the offense.147 In 1988, the facility where he
was committed recommended his release and the trial judge
appointed the same two doctors that had examined Foucha prior
to trial to examine him.148 This panel of doctors was reluctant to
certify Foucha for release.149  The Court invalidated the
Louisiana statute on which Foucha's commitment was based and
held that continued confinement was unconstitutional where the
and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions of release would
ensure the safety of the community or any person...").
141 Id. (finding that "to the extent that the Bail Reform Act permits pretrial detention
on the ground that the arrestee is likely to commit future crimes, it is unconstitutional on
its face").
142 Id. at 750-51.
143 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997) (discussing the importance of
the precedent established in Foucha); see also Friedland, supra note 13, at 91 (stating
that "[t]he most important case preceding the Hendricks decision, however, was probably
Foucha v. Louisiana").
144 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
145 Id. at 74-75.
146 Id. at 73-74 (stating that "[t]he doctors repdrted that Foucha was unable to
distinguish right from wrong and was insane at the time of the offense.").
147 Id. at 73-74.
148 Id. at 74.
149 Id. at 74-75.
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state could no longer show by clear and convincing evidence that
the individual was both mentally ill and dangerous.150
Justice Thomas, who wrote the majority opinion in Hendricks,
authored a dissent in which Justices Rehnquist and Scalia
joined.151 Thomas argued that there is no general fundamental
right to freedom from bodily restraint. 152 Thomas thus concluded
that the Due Process Clause does not prevent a State from
confining an individual who has regained his sanity but
nonetheless remains dangerous.153
B. Kansas v. Hendricks154
In the years following Allen, courts reviewing the civil
confinement of sexually violent predators required that the
statute: (1) seeks to protect society from the dangerous behavior
of sexually violent predators; and (2) provides adequate
treatment after such confinement.155 As a result of Hendricks,
however, courts are now able to apply a much more lenient
standard in evaluating such statutes.156
In 1994, the State of Kansas passed the Sexually Violent
Predator Act.157 The Act was enacted in order to create "a
150 Id. at 86 (concluding that the State to meet its burden of proving that Foucha was
both "insane and dangerous by clear and convincing evidence in order to confine [him]
beyond his criminal sentence, when the basis for his original confinement no longer
exists" and that as such it would be unconstitutional to continue to confine Foucha).
151 Id. at 102 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
152 Id. at 118 (stating "[t]here is simply no basis in our society's history or in the
precedents of this Court to support the existence of a sweeping, general fundamental right
to "freedom from bodily restraint" applicable to all persons in all contexts.").
153 Id. at 124 (concluding "[flinally, I see no basis for holding that the Due Process
Clause per se prohibits a State from continuing to confine in a 'mental institution'-the
federal constitutional definition of which remains unclear-an insanity acquittee who has
recovered his sanity").
154 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
155 See Wisconsin v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 273-74 (Wis. 1995) (concluding that
the Wisconsin civil commitment statute "is aimed at protecting the public by providing
concentrated treatment for convicted sex offenders who are at a high risk to reoffend
based upon a mental disorder which predisposes them to commit acts of sexual violence");
see also Grossman, supra note 90 at 502 (noting that the test to apply is "whether the
statute (1) sought to protect society from the dangerous behavior of a sexually violent
predator; and (2) whether adequate treatment was provided for after such confinement.").
156 See People v. Blakely, 60 Cal. App. 4th 202, 215 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding
the civil confinement of a sexual predator though there was no known medical treatment
for his disorder, because his 'lack of amenability to treatment does not preclude an
extension of his commitment"); see also Grossman, supra note 90, at 502-03 (commenting
that "courts are now free to apply a much more lenient standard than that which was
previously required to satisfy due process.").
157 KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 -59-29a21 (2006).
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separate involuntary civil commitment process for the potentially
long-term control, care and treatment of sexually violent
predators ... ."158 Leroy Hendricks was the first man that the
State of Kansas attempted to commit under the Act.159
Hendricks challenged his confinement on several grounds,
claiming that it violated the Due Process Clause, the Ex Post
Facto Clause, and the Double Jeopardy Clause.160 After the
Kansas Supreme Court invalidated the law, the State petitioned
the Supreme Court for certiorari which was granted.161 The
Supreme Court reversed the lower decision and affirmed the Act
as Constitutional.162
Justice Thomas' plurality opinion proposed two different
interpretations of the Kansas Supreme Court's holding.163 The
first interpretation was that the Kansas Supreme Court had
determined that Hendricks was not treatable under the Act and
thus the sole purpose of his confinement was incapacitation.164
The Kansas Supreme Court thus concluded that absent a
treatable illness, Hendricks could not be confined.165 However,
the Supreme Court refused to adopt this reasoning stressing that
they had never held that the Constitution prohibits a state from
confining an individual for whom no treatment is available.166
The second interpretation offered by the Court was that the
Kansas court concluded that although Hendricks was treatable,
treatment was not the state's overriding concern. 167 The Court
158 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (2006).
159 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350 (stating that "[tihe state invoked the Act for the
first time to commit Leroy Hendricks..."); see also Kimberly A. Dorsett, Note, Kansas v.
Hendricks: Marking the Beginning of a Dangerous New Era in Civil Commitment, 48
DEPAUL L. REV. 113, 132 (1998) (stating "Hendricks was the first person committed under
the SVP Act").
160 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997).
161 See id.
162 See id.
163 See id. at 365, 366-67.
164 See id. at 365 (stating "it is possible to read [the opinion of the lower court] as a
determination that Hendricks' condition was untreatable under the existing Kansas civil
commitment statute, and thus the Act's sole purpose was incapacitation.").
165 See id. (stating "absent a treatable mental illness, the Kansas court concluded,
Hendricks could not be detained against his will.").
166 See id. at 366 (stating "[the Court has] never held that the Constitution prevents a
State from civilly detaining those for whom no treatment is available, but who
nevertheless pose a danger to others.").
167 See id. at 366-67 (stating "[ailternatively, the Kansas Supreme Court's opinion
can be read to conclude that [although] Hendricks' condition is treatable, that treatment
was not the State's 'overriding concern."').
2007]
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 22:1
concluded that even adopting this determination of the state's
motivation, it did not follow that the Act was necessarily punitive
as it remained possible that treatment was at least an ancillary
purpose. 168 The Court thus held that involuntary confinement
pursuant to the Act was not punitive.169
In a dissent joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, Justice
Breyer questioned the act's civil nature. 170 Although Breyer
agreed with the majority that the requirements of substantive
due process had been met,1 71 he argued that the act imposed
further punishment on Hendricks and thus violated the Ex Post
Facto clause.172 Breyer bases this argument on his disagreement
with the majority's conclusion that the act is not punitive.173 In
reaching his conclusion, Breyer discussed several factors. First,
he distinguishes the Kansas Supreme Court's holding that
treatment was not a significant purpose of the Act from the state
court's opposite finding in Allen.174 Second, he looks at the delay
in treatment which results from the application of the Kansas
statute to previously convicted offenders like Hendricks.175
168 See id. (noting that "... this does not rule out the possibility that an ancillary
purpose of the Act was to provide treatment, and it does not require us to conclude that
the Act is punitive.").
169 See id. at 365-67 (noting that where the State has "disavowed any punitive intent"
and took such measures as limiting confinement to a small segment of particularly
dangerous individuals, provided procedural safeguards, directed the segregation of
confined persons from the general prison population and afforded the same status as
others who have been civilly committed and "permitted immediate release upon a showing
that the individual is no longer dangerous or mentally impaired, we cannot say that it
acted with punitive intent").
170 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373-74 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (questing whether the
Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits application of the Act to Hendricks, who committed his
crime prior to Act's enactment).
171 See id. at 374 (stating that the "Kansas Act's 'definition of 'mental abnormality"
satisfies the 'substantive' requirements of the Due Process Clause").
172 See id. at 379 (arguing that the Act's failure to "provide Hendricks (or others like
him) with any treatment until after his release date from prison and only inadequate
treatment thereafter ... and certain other, special features of the Act" leads to the
conclusion that the Act was not "simply an effort to commit Hendricks civilly, but rather
an effort to inflict further punishment upon him" thereby violating the Ex Post Facto
Clause).
173 See id. 379-80 (finding "[c]ertain resemblances between the Act's 'civil
commitment' and traditional criminal punishments" such as confinement and
incapacitation and the use of prosecutors, procedural guarantees, and standards
"traditionally associated with the criminal law").
174 See id. at 383 (distinguishing Allen by observing that the state had had a
statutory duty to provide treatment designed to achieve recovery in a facility especially
set aside to provide psychiatric care; no such safeguards are written into the Kansas Act).
175 See id. at 385. Justice Breyer relies on the text of the Act which delays evaluation
and the beginning of the commitment process until a few weeks prior to the release of the
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Third, Breyer points out the Act's failure to consider less
restrictive alternatives.176 Lastly, Breyer compares the Kansas
Act to that of sixteen other states and concludes that the Kansas
act does not require certain statutory features consistent with a
punitive purpose. 177 Justice Breyer categorizes these acts based
on three factors: (1) whether the act delays treatment until after
the offender has served his criminal sentence, (2) whether the
state considers less restrictive alternatives, and (3) whether the
act applies only prospectively or retrospectively.178 Based on
these criteria he concludes that amongst the acts of these
seventeen states, only the Kansas act both delays treatment and
confinement and fails to consider less restrictive alternatives and
also applies retrospectively.179 Breyer thus concludes that for Ex
Post Facto Clause purposes the Kansas act has a punitive rather
than purely civil purpose as applied to previously convicted sex
offenders. 180
C. The Aftermath of Hendricks
In the opinion of many observers, the Hendricks decision
eroded the right to treatment of sex offenders who are to be
civilly confined.'18 Some fear that in light of this decision, states
individual from prison. He questions why a statute that did not intend to impose further
punishment would not provide for commitment and treatment sooner.
176 See id. at 387-88. Justice Breyer notes that many other States require such a
consideration and argues: "[1]egislation that seeks to help the individual offender as well
as to protect the public would avoid significantly greater restriction of an individual's
liberty than public safety requires." Id.
177 See id. at 388-89 (surveying seventeen States "with laws that seek to protect the
public from mentally abnormal, sexually dangerous individuals through civil commitment
or other mandatory treatment programs").
178 See id. (breaking down the seventeen statutes, Breyer looks to see if the states
have self-remedied any claims of unconstitutionality by examining which statutes provide
for treatment immediately after an offender had been charged, which require
consideration of less restrictive alternatives, and which apply prospectively only).
179 See id. at 389. Breyer finds that seven states including Kansas delay commitment
and treatment until after the offender has completed his criminal sentence, and only one
other state besides Kansas both delays civil commitment and fails to consider less
restrictive alternatives.
180 See id. at 389 (relying on "the practical experience of other States, as revealed by
their statutes, confirms what the Kansas Supreme Court's finding, the timing of the civil
commitment proceeding, and the failure to consider less restrictive alternatives,
themselves suggest, namely, that for Ex Post Facto Clause purposes, the purpose of the
Kansas Act (as applied to previously convicted offenders) has a punitive, rather than a
purely civil, purpose").
181 See Erich H. Gaston, Symposium, Privacy and Autonomy in Health Care: Kansas
v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997); The Court's Unworkable Constitutional Standards
and Flawed Analysis Threaten Freedom, 2 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 227, 251 (1999)
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will be able to use treatment as a "hook" to ensure the
constitutionality of civil confinement statutes without having any
real intention of providing any meaningful treatment.1 8 2
Although cases subsequent to Hendricks have failed to address
this problem, they have added some important dynamics to civil
confinement jurisprudence.
In Seling v. Young,'8 3 the Court rejected an "as applied"
challenge to a civil commitment statute similar to the one in
Hendricks.184 The Court examined the civil nature of the statute
as the petitioner claimed that the act was punitive as applied to
him.185 The Court denied the claim, holding that an "as-applied"
challenge would prove unworkable in determining whether the
act was criminal in nature and thus violating the Ex Post Facto
and Double Jeopardy Clauses.i8 6 The Court reasoned that
allowing such a challenge would prevent a conclusive resolution
as to the punitive nature of a statute and thus whether it was
constitutionally valid.18 7
(noting that the danger of the Hendricks decision is that it "implies that treatment has
little if any bearing on whether a state's decision to civilly commit a person comports with
due process"); see also Grossman, supra note 90, at 503 (stating "after the Hendricks
decision, court are now free to apply a much more lenient standard than that which was
previously required...").
182 See Gaston, supra note 181, at 227 (implying that whether or not the "criminal" in
question receives treatment no longer matters in determining constitutionality); see also
Weeks, supra note 78, at 1274 (explaining that although the Kansas statute in issue in
Hendricks contained provisions which seemingly attributed the measure to the
legislature's desire for treatment, it lacked the actual intention to provide that
treatment).
183 531 U.S. 250 (2001).
184 See id. at 260-61. The statute at issue in Seling functioned much like the one in
Hendricks, when a person who has committed a sexually violent offense is about to be
released, an "attorney files a petition alleging that that person is a sexually violent
predator ... trigger[ing] a process for charging and trying the person as a sexually violent
predator, during which he is afforded... counsel and experts ... a probable cause
hearing, and trial by judge or jury... The Act also provides a procedure to petition for
conditional release to a less restrictive alternative to confinement." Id. at 254-55.
185 See id. at 261-63. The court declared that Hendricks made clear that whether an
act is civil or punitive is a matter of statutory construction, derived from the text and
legislative history. See id. "[C]learest is required to override legislative intent and
conclude that an Act denominated civil is punitive in purpose or effect." Id. Petitioners
here failed to do so and the court therefore worked under the assumption that the Act was
civil in nature. id.
186 Id. at 263 (stating that "[u]nlike a fine, confinement is not a fixed event.., it
extends over time under conditions that are subject to change. The particular features of
confinement may affect how a confinement scheme is evaluated to determine whether it is
civil rather than punitive, but it remains no less true that the query must be answered
definitively. The civil nature of a confinement scheme cannot be altered based merely on
vagaries in the implementation of the authorizing statute")
187 Id. (declaring that "an 'as-applied' analysis would prove unworkable" as it "would
never conclusively resolve whether a particular scheme is punitive and would thereby
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The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act was challenged
before the Supreme Court of the United States for a second time
in Kansas v. Crane.18 This challenge involved the Kansas
Supreme Court's interpretation of Hendricks as requiring "a
finding that the defendant cannot control his dangerous
behavior".18 9 The State of Kansas argued that not only is such a
finding not constitutionally necessary, but the Constitution
permits confinement without any lack-of-control
determination. 190 The Court rejected both of these
interpretations, holding that although Hendricks set forth no
total or complete lack of control requirement, the state could
nonetheless not confine a sexually violent individual without
some lack of control determination. 191
The most recent of the major cases relevant to the civil
confinement of sexual predators was Smith v. Doe,1 92 decided in
2003. Although Smith involved a challenge to a community
notification law rather than a civil confinement statute, the
Court's analysis of the act's civil nature was nonetheless similar.
The Alaska law at issue contained both a notification
requirement and a registration system requiring sex offenders to
register if they were physically present in the State of Alaska.193
The petitioner claimed the act violated the Ex Post Facto Clause
of the Constitution because its two components were applied
retroactively. 94 Like the claims in many of the cases discussed
above, this challenge relied on the plaintiffs contention that the
prevent a final determination" as to a statute's constitutionality-a statute might remain
in perpetual constitutional limbo awaiting an instance in which its heretofore just
application exceeds the confines of the Constitution).
188 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
189 Id. at 411.
190 See id. at 411-12 (stating that "Kansas now argues that the Kansas Supreme
Court wrongly read Hendricks as requiring the State always to provide that a dangerous
individual is completely unable to control his behavior").
191 See id. (stating constitutional necessity of distinguishing between dangerous
sexual offenders who require civil commitment versus those who can be dealt with in
criminal proceedings alone).
192 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
193 See Smith, 538 U.S. at 90. A sex offender's knowing failure to comply with the Act
results in criminal charges.
194 See id. at 92. Petitioner's claim invoked the well established framework for
dealing with claims that a statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court must
"ascertain whether the legislature meant the statute to establish 'civil' proceedings."
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997).
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act was criminal in nature. 195 The Court, relying on Hendricks,
considered this primarily a question of statutory construction
and gave deference to the stated intent of the state legislature.196
The Court held that where the challenger could not show that the
effects of the law negate Alaska's intention to create civil
regulation, the act is non-punitive and thus does not violate the
Ex Post Facto clause.197
IV. ANALYSIS: ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF A SEXUALLY VIOLENT
PREDATOR STATUTE
With so many states now having sexually violent predator
statutes and several more seeking to pass them in the future, it
is of major importance to discuss what features of current
statutes best advance the goals of civil confinement. This is
particularly important as new states seeking to enact their own
sexually violent predator laws will no doubt model their own
after those of states whose laws have been upheld by the
Supreme Court.198 As stated above, it is critical that states
properly balance society's interest in protecting the public with
the fundamental liberty and fairness interests of those whom the
state is seeking to confine. It is asserted that the most ideal
sexually violent predator statutes must include the features
described below.
A. Individualized Treatment Plans
The specificity with which civil confinement statutes address
treatment of confined individuals varies from detailed and
195 See id. (stating that a finding of legislative intent to impose punishment
establishes a statute's criminal nature).
196 See id. (noting that "[O]nly the clearest proof' will suffice to override legislative
intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty"
(quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 (1997) (quoting United States v.
Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980)))).
197 See Smith, 538 U.S. at 105-06 (reversing Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
and remanding for further proceedings).
198 See, e.g., Susan R. Klein, Special Issue: Redrawing the Criminal-Civil Boundary, 2
BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 679, 708 (1999) (stating that Texas' statute is modeled after Kansas
statute); see also Tanya M. Montano, Comment, Will California's Sexually Violent
Predators Act Survive Constitutional Attacks?, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 317, 335 (1998)
(noting that "[tihe New York Legislature waited for the Supreme Court to address the
issue before it passed its own statute" and "l]egislatures in Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New Hamps.ire, Nevada and North Dakota are
currently developing similar statutes following the Hendricks decision").
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explicit to very broad and general. Some states require that each
individual be treated in accordance with an individualized
treatment plan.199 In order to ensure such treatment is provided
there are often requirements that the treating authority keep
detailed records regarding the treatment being provided to
individual patients. 200 Other states are much less protective of
the right to treatment and thus define this right in a much
broader manner.201  These state statutes are particularly
problematic in light of the Hendricks decision and the erosion of
the right to treatment.202
It is argued that the treatment of confined individuals is of
utmost importance in ensuring that sexual predator commitment
programs are not abused as a method for incapacitating offenders
permanently. Instead, the state should intend through
treatment of the individual to progress towards a goal of
reintegrating the offender into society. Since it is unlikely that
any two offenders will be the same in the nature and root of their
problems, 203 it becomes essential that sexual predators are
treated and evaluated as individuals rather than through a
199 See e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.080 (West 2006) (providing a right to adequate
care and individualized treatment); see also Committee on Criminal Law, Principles on
Megan's Law, 52 THE RECORD 704, 710 (1997) (stating that individualized treatment plans
for sex offenders are to be made by qualified professionals to ensure they address
offender's individual pathology, serving both the individual and the community to prevent
recidivism).
200 See MASS GEN LAWS ch. 123A, § 16 (2005) (requiring annual reports be submitted
to clerks of the senate and house of representatives describing treatment offered and
treatment provided to each person who has been committed); see also WASH. REV. CODE §
71.09.080(2) (West 2006) (stating that "[tihe department of social and health services shall
keep records detailing all medical, expert, and professional care and treatment received
by a committed person...").
201 See e.g., FLA. STAT. § 394.922 (2006) (noting that "[tihe long-term control, care,
and treatment of a person committed under this part must conform to constitutional
requirements"); see also IOWA CODE § 229A.9 (2005) (explaining "The involuntary
detention or commitment of persons under this chapter shall conform to constitutional
requirements for care and treatment.").
202 See Friedland, supra note 13, at 112 (commenting that "the Court no longer had to
examine the circumstances of a commitment to determine whether the law met the
treatment minimum; it could now simply look at the face of the law"); see also Weeks,
supra note 78, at 1274 (suggesting that although premised on care and treatment, the
statute at issue in Hendricks had no such intentions).
203 See Committee on Criminal Law, Principles on Megan's Law, 52 THE RECORD 704,
710 (1997) (stating that "[t]he treatment plan for a sex offender should be designed to
address the individual pathology of the sex offender. The recommendation should
incorporate the sex offender's personal history, characteristics, targets and modus
operandi. The treatment plan should address each sex offender individually, because
different sex offenders will require different plans..."); see also Friedland, supra note 13,
at 81 (stating that although sexual predators may share similar characteristics, "there are
many differences among them as well, preventing a clear "profile" from being developed").
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general program treating all offenders in the same manner.
Thus, individualized treatment plans allow professionals to
examine the offenders and set forth a course of treatment that
will present the best opportunity for the state to improve the
condition of these offenders to the point that they are no longer a
danger to society.204
B. Less Restrictive Alternatives
Another important feature of civil confinement statutes is the
availability of less restrictive alternatives to which a sexual
predator can be assigned.205 These alternatives may include
court ordered treatment in an environment that is less restrictive
than total confinement. 206 In states offering this option, the
individual will be eligible for a less restrictive alternative
provided certain requirements are met.207 Most significantly the
person must no longer be at a high risk to reoffend. 208 One factor
204 See Anita Schlank & Pam Bidelman, Transition - Challenges for the Offender and
the Community, in THE SEXUAL PREDATOR VOLUME II 10-7 (Anita Schlank and Fred
Cohen ed., 1999) (arguing "[tireatment programs and staff need opportunities to validate
the sex offender's progress in a way that protects public safety, avoids revictimization or
new victims, and enhances the offender's ability to function without incident in less
restrictive environments"); see also Anita Schlank and Rick Harry, Examining Our
Approaches to Sex Offenders & The Law: The Treatment of the Civilly Committed Sex
Offender in Minnesota: A Review of the Past Ten Years, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1221,
1226-27 (2003) (noting that "it is extremely important that sex offenders are observed at
all times during their treatment... Only through constant observation... can the staff
be assured that the patients have progressed to a point where they can be gradually re-
integrated into the community.").
205 See e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3701(4) (2006) (defining less restrictive alternative
as "court ordered treatment in a setting that is less restrictive than total confinement and
that is conducted in a setting approved by the superintendent of the state hospital"); see
also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3707 (B) (2006) (allowing the court to either commit the person
to the custody of department of health services or order that the person be released to a
less restrictive alternative after court or jury determines the person to be a sexually
violent predator).
206 See WASH. REV CODE § 71.09.020 (6) (2005) (noting that the "less restrictive
alternative" means court-ordered treatment in a setting less restrictive than total
confinement"); see also In re Brock, 995 P.2d 111, 113 (2000) (noting that "it is irrelevant
that the treatment itself may be less restrictive than what is provided at the secure
facility. Rather, it is the setting that must be less restrictive than total confinement.").
207 See IOWA CODE § 229A.8A (2) (2005) (providing conditions that individual must
meet in order to be eligible for a less restrictive alternative); see also WASH. REV. CODE §
71.09.092 (West 2006) (requiring certain findings prior to release to a less restrictive
alternative).
208 See IOWA CODE § 229A.1 (2005) (stating the general assembly's findings that
sexually violent predators have a high likelihood of engaging in repeat acts and therefore
require long-term care and treatment different from traditional treatment found in prison
setting); see also IOWA CODE § 229A.8A (2005)(2)(a) (explaining that "[t]he committed
person's mental abnormality is no longer such that the person is a high risk to reoffend.").
CIVIL CONFINEMENT OF SEXUAL PREDATORS
that differs from state to state is the time and manner in which
an individuals release to a less restrictive alternative will be
considered. Some states may consider less restrictive
alternatives at the time of a finding that the person is a sexually
violent predator,209  while others may only consider less
restrictive alternatives as a form of conditional release after a
certain period of confinement. 210 The latter is very important as
a gradual transition period will allow treatment providers to
monitor offenders as they demonstrate responsibility through
gradually increased privileges. 211
It is suggested that whether a state considers less restrictive
alternatives for those it deems to be sexually violent predators
provides an important insight into the state's intentions. It seems
more likely that a state's intentions are truly civil if they
consider the possibility of treating an offender in less than total
confinement than if they put each offender deemed to be
dangerous into a complete confinement facility without
considering other options which would have a lesser effect on the
individual's freedom. In his Hendricks dissent, Justice Breyer
considered whether a statute considers less restrictive
alternatives to be an important indicator of the legislature's true
purpose. 212 He reasoned that a State intending to both help the
individual and protect the public would seek to limit the
restriction on an individual's liberty to no more than what is
209 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3707(B) (2006) (providing a less restrictive alternative
as an alternative to commitment after a finding that the person is a sexually violent
predator); see also ARIz. REV. STAT. § 36-3711(1-3) (2006) (allowing for release to a less
restrictive alternative if person undergoes a specific course of treatment and obtains
housing "sufficiently secure to protect the community").
210 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6607(a) (West 2006) (allowing conditional release
"[i]f the Director of Mental Health determines that the person's diagnosed mental
disorder has so changed that the person is not likely to commit acts of predatory sexual
violence while under supervision and treatment in the community"); see also WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 980.08(1) (West 2006) (granting the right to petition"
211 See Schlank & Bidelman, supra note 204, at 10-1, 10-2 (commenting on the
difficulty that sexual predators have in readjusting to society); see also Managing Sex
Offenders in the Community: A National Overview, 27 (2003), at http://www.atsa.com
/pdfs/Managing Sex Offenders in the Community-A National Overview.pdf (listing follow
up treatment as an encouraged or mandatory procedure for sexual offenders as one of the
principles of treatment).
212 See See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 388 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissentihg)
(noting that "[t]his Court has stated that a failure to consider, or to use, 'alternative and
less harsh methods' to achieve a nonpunitive objective can help to show that legislature's
'purpose... was to punish"')(quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20 (1979)).
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necessary for the protection of the public.213 In offering less
restrictive alternatives, the state can protect society by both
monitoring his release and treating him with the aim of reducing
the likelihood that he will commit future offenses; while at the
same time allowing the person to retain their liberty.
C. Frequency of Reevaluation
One feature that is fairly uniform in state sexual predator laws
is the periodic reexamination of confined individuals. Most
states require that an individual be reexamined once per year to
ensure he still meets the requirements for confinement. 2 14 Some
states require even more frequent reevaluations for a period
following initial commitment and then annually thereafter. 215
The procedure and depth of this reexamination varies from state
to state and may include a report filed by the confining authority
assessing the current mental condition of the individual. 216 Some
states provide significant procedural protections to ensure
individuals who are no longer dangerous are released. For
example, the State of New Mexico provides "[a]t the expiration of
the commitment order the client may be detained only after a
new commitment hearing ... "217 Conversely, the State of Iowa
has a rebuttable presumption that the individual should remain
confined. 218
The author asserts that periodic review of the confined
individual's status should act to provide a procedure for ensuring
213 See id. at 388 (noting that "[1]egislation that seeks to help the individual offender
as well as to protect the public would avoid significantly greater restriction of an
individual's liberty than public safety requires").
214 See e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN § 59-29a08(a) (2005) (requiring a current examination of
the person's mental condition once per year); see also WiS. STAT. ANN. § 980.08(1) (West
2006) (allowing a review of confinement after twelve months).
215 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 207/55(a) (West's Smith-Hurd 2005)(a) (requiring a
report within six months of initial confinement); see also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.08(1)
(West 2006) (stating that committed persons can petition the committing court to modify
its release 12 months since the initial commitment or at least 12 months have elapsed
since the most recent release petition was denied).
216 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 207/55(b) (West's Smith-Hurd 2005) (indicating the
standard to which the examination should conform); see also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 980.08(3)
(West 2006) (leaving the court to determine whether or not an examiner has the
specialized knowledge).
217 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-12(C) (West 2006).
218 See IOWA CODE § 229A.8(1) (2006) (stating "[u]pon civil commitment of a person
pursuant to this chapter, a rebuttable presumption exists that the commitment should
continue"); see also In re Detention of Shelby, 710 N.W.2d 249, 250 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005)
(holding that the previous version of the statute is facially constitutional).
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that those who continue to be dangerous remain committed,
while those whose conditions have improved to the point that
they are no longer dangerous are released. An annual review can
also function as a mechanism for reviewing the type of treatment
being provided, its level of success and whether a modified
treatment plan might be more successful. Lastly, these
evaluations might consider whether the confined individual's
condition has improved sufficiently that he might now be an
appropriate candidate for a less restrictive alternative as
discussed above.
D. Right to Petition for Release
Another feature that varies greatly from state to state is the
right of a confined individual to petition for his release. 219 While
some states permit confined individuals to petition for release at
any time, 220 others are much more restrictive and only allow the
person to petition for release with the permission of an official
charged with his supervision.221 Many states provide a mutual
right to petition for release allowing both the confined individual
to petition for release and the supervising authority to authorize
a petition for release upon a finding that the individual is no
longer dangerous. 222 Since there exists a great potential for a
confined individual to abuse his right to petition for his own
release by making frequent frivolous petitions, this privilege is
219 See WiS. STAT. ANN. § 980.08(1) (West 2006) (permitting any person committed
under the act to petition the court for conditional release); see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. §
207/55(a) (West's Smith-Hurd 2006) (requiring the Secretary to authorize the person to
petition for his release if at any time the Secretary determines that the confined
individual is no longer a sexually violent person).
220 See e.g. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.08 (West 2006) (providing the committed person a
procedure to petition for release without authorization); see also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 841.122 (Vernon's 2006) (requiring notice to the confined person of his right
to make an unauthorized petition).
221 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 207/55 (West's Smith-Hurd 2006) (failing to provide a
procedure for petition to the committed party); see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
6607(a) (West 2006) (giving the responsibility to the "Director of Mental Health" to make
a "report and recommendation" for release).
222 See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3709 (2006) (allowing the director to permit the
confined individual to petition for release upon the determination of the "superintendent
of the state hospital or the director of the department of health services" and allowing the
committed person to annually petition the court for conditional release without
superintendent or director approval); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.090(1) (West
2006) (allowing the secretary to petition for release but noting that this does not prohibit
the committed person to do so without approval).
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often qualified and can be forfeited by those engaging in such
behavior. 223
It is put forth that when exercised and administered properly,
this mutual ability to petition for release can provide an
important safeguard of the liberties of the individual confined.
On the one hand, by giving the person charged with the care of
the individual the ability to permit a petition for release, this
process hopefully ensures that when an individual is clearly no
longer a sexually violent predator he will be considered for
release. Similarly, the individual is protected by possessing
ability to petition himself for release without the need for others
to first determine that such a petition is appropriate.
Unfortunately this can become a hollow right if the reviewing
authority never seriously considers these petitions. Nonetheless,
the more steps that are taken to protect an individual's rights the
more likely that the individual will gain a good faith
determination of his condition and will thus be released when
appropriate.
E. The Best of the Statutes
Of the sixteen states that currently have statutes for the civil
confinement of sexual predators, less than a handful include all
of the features described above. Although most of the statutes
include some of these features, only three include all of them in
some form. These are the statutes enacted in the states of New
Mexico, 224 Texas,225 and Washington. 226 These statutes make
these important procedures available to their respective states
while also providing important safeguards. Each includes a
specific and individualized right to treatment.227 These statutes
223 See FLA. STAT. § 394.920 (2006) (providing for the individual to petition for release
at any time provided he has not previously abused the procedure by filing frivolous
petitions); see also Kelly A. McCaffrey, Comment, The Civil Commitment of Sexually
Violent Predators in Kansas: A Modern Law for Modern Times, 42 KAN. L. REV. 887, 894
(1994) (commenting that "[i]f the court determines that the petition is frivolous, the court
must deny it without a hearing.").
224 N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-1-1- 43-1-25 (West 2006).
225 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.001 (Vernon's 2006).
226 WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.09.010 - 71.09.902 (West 2006).
227 See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-7 (West 2006) (stating "[elach resident client receiving
mental health services shall have the right to prompt treatment pursuant to an
individualized treatment plan"); see also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.083(a)
(West 2005) (requiring the council to "approve and contract for the provision of a
treatment plan for the committed person to be developed by the treatment provider");
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also consider less restrictive alternatives to complete
confinement. 228 Like most others, these states also provide for an
annual examination to determine whether continued
confinement is necessary. 229 Finally, these statutes provide a
right to the confined individual to petition for release without
permission of the confining authority and give the authority the
ability to allow a petition upon a determination that the person is
no longer dangerous. 230 It is asserted that these three statutes
provide proper protections of the rights of confined individuals
and thus do the best job possible of balancing society's interests
with the rights of those the states seek to confine.
CONCLUSION
Given the nature of the problem of sexual predators, especially
those who prey on children, there is always sure to be strong
feelings favoring harsher penalties and confinement of these
individuals. On the other hand, many groups dedicated to
protecting certain fundamental rights are sure to feel equally as
strong that it is not only fundamentally unfair but
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.080(2) (West 2006) (providing "the right to adequate care and
individualized treatment" and additionally requiring records be kept "detailing all
medical, expert, and professional care and treatment received by a committed person").
228 N.M. STAT. ANN § 43-1-21(A) (West 2006) (providing for release to convalescent
status); see also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.081(a) (Vernon's 2006)
(providing that upon a finding that the individual is a sexually violent predator "the judge
shall commit the person for outpatient treatment and supervision"); WASH. REV. CODE §
71.09.094(1) (West 2006) (providing for the individual to be released conditionally to a less
restrictive alternative upon certain findings).
229 N.M. STAT. ANN § 43-1-12(c) (West 2006) (providing for commitment periods of no
more than six months and preventing commitment after expiration only after a new
commitment hearing); see also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN § 841.101(a) (Vernon's
2006) (providing for a biennial examination of the confined individual); see also WASH.
REV. CODE § 71.09.070 (West 2006) (stating "[e]ach person committed under this chapter
shall have a current examination of his or her mental condition made by the department
of social and health services at least once every year.").
230 See N.M. STAT. ANN § 43-1-12(D) (West 2006) (providing a right to reexamination
on the petition of the confined individual); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.121(a)
(Vernon's 2006) (stating "[i]f the case manager determines that the committed person's
behavioral abnormality has changed to the extent that the person is no longer likely to
engage in a predatory act of sexual violence, the case manager shall authorize the person
to petition the court for release"); see also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841.122
(Vernon's 2006) (allowing petition for release without authorization and requiring that
the individual be notified annually of this right); see WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.090 (West
2006) (allowing the secretary to authorize the individual to petition for release to a less
restrictive alternative if the person's condition has so changed that he is no longer
dangerous or release to a less restrictive alternative is in his best interests and adding
"[n]othing contained in this chapter shall prohibit the person from otherwise petitioning
the court for conditional release to a less restrictive alternative" without approval).
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unconstitutional to confine an individual against his will once his
criminal sentence has been served. As a result this issue must be
handled delicately considering both the interests of protecting
our neighborhoods and of preserving the fundamental right to
liberty. It is asserted that when one interest has to prevail the
scales must tip in favor of protecting society. If they are properly
drafted and administered, these sexually violent predator
statutes can adequately address both of these concerns. They
can effectively help protect society from sexual predators by
incapacitating them and at the same time confine individuals in
such a manner which is both consistent with the constitution and
fair. Additionally, we can strive to treat those individuals who
are amenable to such treatment with the goal of reintegrating
them into society confident that they no longer pose a risk. This
is not to say that civil confinement should be used liberally, but
should instead be reserved for only those offenders who have
exhibited serious mental characteristics which render them
dangerous to our society. Given the nature of sex crimes and the
long term effects they cause their victims, we can not release
offenders who we know remain dangerous into society where they
may strike again.
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